Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) represent the backbone of China's economy, yet they lack access to bank credit. SMEs thus rely on a wide range of alternative sources, including informal finance, online peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms, registered non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), and underground financiers. This paper distinguishes among different types of 'shadow banking' to clarify popular misconceptions about the nature of risks associated with informal financial intermediation in China. The evolution of SME finance in other contexts suggests that regulated and well-managed NBFCs provide an enduring foundation for commercialised financial intermediation even in advanced industrialised economies.
Financing Small and Medium Enterprises in China: Recent Trends and Prospects beyond Shadow Banking
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 'There is a mismatch between China's real economy and the financial system. The country's real economy is largely comprised of farmers, small and medium-sized businesses, and yet the financial sector is dominated by big banks that prefer to deal with big companies.'
-Justin Yifu Lin, Peking University, 28 August 2014 'The Asian financial crisis provides ample evidence of the risks associated with the absence of a balanced financial sector with multiple channels of financial intermediation. NBFIs play an important role in a balanced and diversified financial sector that is relatively robust and stable.'
-The World Bank, 2002 In recent years, alarmist headlines about the rise of shadow banking in China have obscured fundamental structural realities about the relationship between the country's economic growth and financial development. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for over 97 per cent of registered industrial firms in China [ADB, 2013] . 1 They also employ nearly 65 per cent of the workforce and generate 60 per cent of China's GDP. Yet larger state-owned enterprises (SOEs) receive over 75 per cent of loans extended by state-owned commercial banks [Netease Finance, 2014] , and account for over 60 per cent of publicly listed businesses on China's stock markets [Zhongguowang, 2012] . Given such financing constraints, it is not surprising that SMEs rely on a remarkable variety of non-banking financing mechanisms. These include traditional forms of informal finance, online peer-topeer (P2P) platforms, microfinance institutions, and legally registered nonbanking financial institutions (NBFIs). Popular media coverage of shadow banking misleadingly implies that all forms of non-bank finance carry substantial risk. By contrast, this paper distinguishes among different types of non-bank finance to clarify popular misconceptions about informal financial intermediation in China. Given that SME demand for financial services will continue to expand, it is important to understand the reasons for this demand;
the institutions that have emerged in response; the regulatory environment for mitigating risk in the non-banking financial sector; and the potential trajectory of SME finance in China.
The paper makes three main arguments. First, the SME financing gap will persist as a systemic issue in China given that demand for SME finance is growing faster than its supply. Second, the services provided by NBFIs should not be conflated reflexively with shadow banking. Third, the evolution of SME finance in other contexts suggests that regulated and well-managed NBFIs provide an enduring foundation for commercialised financial intermediation even in advanced industrialised economies. Empirically, the paper draws on government statistics, SME surveys, and case studies of NBFIs. The findings are framed relative to how SME finance has developed in other East Asian and OECD countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the evolution and contribution of private SMEs to China's reform-era economy. The second section summarises the reasons why SMEs continue to face challenges in accessing bank credit. The third section addresses definitional issues relating to non-banking 
SMEs: China's Economic Engine
SMEs have represented the backbone of China's economic growth since the commencement of economic reform in the late 1970s. The following brief historical overview of private sector development in the past three decades shows how SMEs emerged on the margins of the socialist economy, earned official legitimacy, and continue to thrive as an essential, flexible, marketoriented core of the Chinese economy.
During the early years of the reform era, individual entrepreneurs who lacked stable wage employment in the state sector took advantage of the loosening policy environment to engage in petty commerce and trading. Private restaurants, retail stores, and rural household factories sprung up swiftly in reaction to gaps left by the socialist economy [Solinger, 1984] . Although it was illegal to run private enterprises with more than eight workers until 1988, China's entrepreneurs nonetheless devised creative ways to disguise growing manufacturing operations by falsely registering them as 'collective enterprises,'
which did not face any numerical limits on employees. 2 Such businesses were called 'red hat enterprises' because they wore a politically acceptable registration status. The official ideological slogan of building 'market socialism with Chinese characteristics' left room for such practices, which stretched the boundaries of the planned economy into increasingly unplanned sectors.
Ultimately, China's private entrepreneurs not only stretched, but also redefined the legal boundaries for profit-oriented activities [Tsai, 2007] In addition to steady growth in business registrations, share of urban employment, and contribution to China's industrial output, private firms have also outperformed the state sector in terms of return on assets (ROA). Figure 4 shows that the private sector has consistently maintained a higher ROA than state-owned industrial enterprises; and the gap in ROA has widened markedly 
Limits on Bank Lending to Private SMEs
Despite their on-going contributions to China's economic development, SMEs face significant barriers in accessing credit from state-owned commercial banks. In 2013, only 23.2 per cent of bank loans were extended to SMEs [CBRC, 2014] . Access to working capital loans is even more restricted: only 4.7 per cent of short-term loans went to SMEs. Indeed, one of the enduring paradoxes of China's reform-era growth is its maintenance of a bank-dominated financial system that privileges lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than the thriving private sector. There are five main reasons why the most productive, market-oriented sector of China's economy is marginalised by the state banking system. 3 The first is rooted in political concerns about supporting the state sector and maintaining social stability. State banks have been pressured by local governments to provide soft loans to SOEs as a means to avoid mass unemployment. This is one of the main reasons why state banks had accumulated such high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) by the 1990s.
Although China's 'Big 4' commercial banks were subsequently recapitalised in preparation for their IPOs in the 2000s, NPLs have grown and re-emerged as a potential concern since the stimulus-induced bank lending of the late 2000s [Zhang, Tian and Li, 2012; Weinland, 2015] . [Garaci, 2012] . Indeed, sub-branch level officers are primarily charged with attracting deposits and have limited authority over credit decisions.
Third and relatedly, on-going financial repression-meaning governmental suppression of interest rates below market levels-serves industrial policy at the expense of savers. Under financial repression, household savings have been transferred through the banking system to subsidise credit to SOEs, capital-intensive industry, and real estate developers [Pettis, 2013; Lardy, 1998 ]. Interest rate ceilings also inhibit lending to SMEs because banks are not able to price loans to reflect the trade-off between profit and risk. 4  Underground finance includes practices and organisations that are not registered, and therefore, related financial transactions are not legally protected. The usage of this term overlaps with informal finance, and has been sub-divided further into 'grey' forms of underground finance-that facilitate economically productive or socially beneficial activities-and 'black' finance, which has detrimental effects.
 Illegal finance is limited to criminal and fraudulent financial transactions that may constitute various forms of corruption, including embezzlement of state funds.
 Unobserved finance is the broadest category, encompassing any financial activity that is not captured in national accounting and statistical information systems. The entirety of illegal finance falls into this category, as do the 'black' portions of underground and informal finance.
The diffusion of 'shadow banking' into popular discourse in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis has complicated the preceding conceptual distinctions by casting a pejorative film over non-banking financial intermediation in general. 7 The irony is that shadow banking originally referred to opaque products issued by well-established formal banks. The term 'shadow banking' gained prominence in 2007 in the context of financial institutions in the United States that engaged in 'maturity transformation' by using short term funds (e.g., deposits) to finance longer term assets (e.g., real estate) [Kodres, 2013] . More specifically, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York identifies securitised financial instruments-including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and repurchase agreements (repos)-as shadow banking [Pozar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky, 2010] . [Wang and Li, 2013; Shi, 2014] . To put things in comparative perspective, this represented 48 per cent and 57 per cent of China's GDP in those years, respectively. By contrast, in the US the value of shadow banking exceeds GDP by over three times.
The FSB's encompassing definition of shadow banking may help regulators identify sectors in need of greater prudential oversight. Given the term's negative connotation, however, lumping all forms of non-banking financial intermediation into 'shadow banking' offers limited analytic value for understanding the types of activities that carry systemic risk versus those that are established features of a healthy financial system serving diversified markets. Rather than mince the precise boundaries of formal vs. informal and legal vs. illegal finance, Table 2 presents the forms of non-banking financial intermediation used by SMEs in China according to their degree of institutionalisation. The latter can be assessed based on the extent to which they entail documented rules and procedures, the stability of their physical or virtual operating space, and whether they are legitimately registered and regulated with a government entity. 9 P2P sites have already ceased operating since 2011 [Weinland, 2014] . Figure 5 shows the various forms of non-banking financial intermediaries according to their degree of institutionalisation and regulation. The above typology focuses on the types of non-banking financial intermediation used by SMEs in China rather than the entire universe of what is now associated with shadow banking. In 2014, the PRC State Council [2014] identified the following three categories of shadow banking from a regulatory perspective:
1) Unlicensed and unregulated financial operators (e.g., underground banks, internet finance, P2P lending) 2) Entities operating without a finance license and inadequate supervision by credit agencies (e.g., pawnshops, credit guarantee companies, microfinance companies) 3) Inadequately supervised activities of licensed financial institutions (e.g., money market funds, wealth management products, asset securitisation).
The State Council's definition represents a reversal of the CBRC's statement, just two years earlier, that non-banking financial institutions (such as trust companies, finance companies, and off-balance sheet transactions of banks) did not constitute shadow banking [Gao and Wang, 2014] . This reversal may be attributed to the unexpectedly rapid growth of two forms of shadow banking, inspiring anxiety on the part of regulators and industry observers: local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and wealth management products (WMPs).
Since 2008, over 10,000 loosely regulated LGFVs have been established by local governments.
LGFVs broker off balance sheet loans between state banks and local governments who offer revenues from land sales and real estate as collateral.
LGFVs have become the primary channel through which sub-national governments have financed public goods and large-scale infrastructure projects.
Following an emergency national audit of local public finance, the National Audit
Office [2013] estimates that by mid-2013 local government debt had reached 17.9 trillion yuan ($2.9 trillion), an increase of 60 per cent since the end of 2010.
Various analysts observe that
LGFVs pose systemic risk due to their reliance on new debt to finance longer-term investment [Nomura, 2013] . The IMF estimates that local government debt reached 36 per cent of GDP in 2013 [Wei and Davis, 2015] . 11
Meanwhile, in partnership with banks, trust companies have been offering WMPs that advertise higher returns than the 3.3 per cent deposit rates in regular savings accounts [Zhang, 2014] . There is ambiguity in how WMPs in China identifies three layers of shadow banking based on such criteria: the bank off-balance sheet financing layer, the credit enhancement layer, and the non-bank lending layer [Sheng, Edelmann, Sheng and Hu, 2015] .
In the top bank off-balance sheet financing layer, banks evade regulatory restrictions on capital requirements and loan-to-debt ratios by extending credit through off-balance sheet 'channeling.' The off balance-sheet supply of WMPs through trusts is the most prominent example of this top layer of shadow banking. The main source of risk stems from the mismatch between asset risk and investor appetite for risk, meaning that consumers may not be fully cognizant of the risk associated with securitised assets implicitly promising returns substantially above the bank deposit rates.
In the second credit enhancement layer of shadow banking, non-banking financial companies extend loans to businesses that are unable to access bank credit, or enable lower-credit borrowers to access larger loans from banks by providing guarantees. There is potential risk to banks because such institutions serve borrowers that unassisted, might not meet the credit standards of banks.
For example, when one business faces debt service challenges in a reciprocal loan guarantee network, all the other bank loans guaranteed by that business, either directly or indirectly, are also at risk. In speculative post-mortem accounts of COG's demise, observers point to red flags such as COG's registration in the Cayman Islands. At the time, however, even ADB's external legal counsel concurred that working with an offshore entity would be less bureaucratic than a PRC-listed company [Sharman, 2012] . Along similar lines, others reflect retrospectively, 'A diffuse holding structure that includes eight offshore and nine onshore entities makes it difficult to identify where assets may be hiding, or indeed, if the original structure still exists' [Robertson, 2014] . Ultimately, COG's failure was probably a combination of nontransparent governance, coupled with internal mismanagement and underregulation. Although COG's case attracted international media coverage, it was not alone. During the same period, Huading Guarantee Company was similarly exposed for poor risk management and irregular practices [Dong and Shan, 2010] . In 2012, the collapse of a particularly prominent CGC in Beijing, Zhongdan Investment Credit Guarantee, revealed that it had been advertising high returns to its customers by using portions of guaranteed loans to invest in wealth management products [Yang and Ma, 2012] . Similarly questionable practices were linked with waves of CGC failures in Wenzhou and Zhengzhou that same year.
Gangyu Guaranty and Non-guaranty Affiliates
The negative cases of CGCs discussed above receive more media attention Hanxi Group, 2011] . 16 As the first Sino-foreign CGC in
Chongqing, Gangyu prides itself in using tighter credit scoring standards, conducting more in-depth due diligence of clients, and closer monitoring of staff and workflow processes than other CGCs. 17 
NBFIs and Financial Development in Comparative Perspective
The reliance of China's SMEs on NBFIs and less institutionalised forms of informal finance is understandable given the challenges they face in accessing bank credit. China's SMEs are not unique in this respect. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), SMEs in emerging markets account for 60 per cent of the global SME funding gap (total funding required minus total funding received), yet SMEs receive only 20 per cent of the total credit extended in the world [Sheng, Ng and Edelmann, 2013] . Within the latter, NBFIs represent the primary source of institutionalised credit for SMEs.
Traditional theories of development have tended to assume that NBFIs would gradually be displaced by banks-and that banks would be subsumed by financial markets-in a linear progression towards economic modernisation. Yet the post-war historical experience shows that the credit intermediation provided by NBFIs is not merely a transitional phenomenon in the process of financial development. NBFIs have played a more salient role in developing and newlyindustrialised economies, but they also represent a major source of SME finance even in countries with well-established banks and equity markets. There is a fundamental market logic to the enduring developmental and commercial relevance of NBFIs. As explained in a World Bank study [2002] ,
NBFIs complement banks by providing services that are not well suited to banks; they fill the gaps in financial services that otherwise occur in bank-based financial systems. Equally important, NBFIs provide competition for banks in the provision of financial services. NBFIs unbundle the services provided by banks and provide the components on a competitive basis. They specialise in particular sectors and target particular groups. They overcome legal and tax impediments, and they enjoy informational advantages arising from specialisation. In addition to complementing banks, NBFIs can add to economic strength to the extent that they enhance the resilience of the financial system to economic shocks [Vlcek, 2014] .
The positive functional roles of NBFIs are of course dependent on appropriate regulation and internal management of NBFIs themselves. Private NBFIs can be more nimble and innovative than policy-regulated banks and NBFIs subsidised by the government. With this in mind, the final section of this paper provides a brief historical overview of how SME financing evolved in Western Europe and North America, followed by more recent examples of non-banking financial intermediation in Asia.
SME Finance in Early Industrialisers
Over the course of the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, modern financial institutions emerged in tandem with industrialisation in North America and various northern and west European countries. Most accounts of North Atlantic financial history focus on the rise of organised securities markets and universal banks in supporting military expenditures, infrastructure investment, long-distance trade, and industrial development [Dickson, P.G.M, 1967; Gerschenkron, 1962; Tilly, 1966 and Tracy, 1998 ]. Governmental entities and large enterprises were the primary beneficiaries of these formal financial institutions. As the industrialisation process facilitated the rise of large firms, it also fostered increasing heterogeneity in business organisation and scale.
Vertically integrated corporations dominated the market for mass produced goods, while SMEs concentrated on niches requiring greater specialisation and flexibility. By the early twentieth century, all the leading industrial economies had flourishing SME sectors [Kinghorn and Nye, 1996] .
Because equity markets and major banks were not geared towards low volume transactions, SMEs formed partnerships based on personal connections, and relied on alternative sources of finance, such as credit cooperatives, local banks, and informal intermediaries [Cull, Davis, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2005] .
A variety of practices based on localised networks emerged to support SME credit throughout the North Atlantic core. On the European continent, notaries accumulated information about borrowers and lenders in the process of drawing up contracts, which in turn, enabled them to broker assets. Notaries were less prevalent in Anglo-American countries, but the spread of credit reporting agencies supported the establishment of local banks to provide credit to SMEs. In France, short-term commercial debt took the form of trade credit. Diverse indigenous innovations for SME financing not only coexisted with increasingly sophisticated capital markets, commercial banks, and investment banks, but thrived due to growing demand [Cull et al., 2005] .
The subsequent development of modern financial systems in the North Atlantic countries did not diminish the organisational diversity of financial institutions or the importance of NBFIs for SME financing. By the same token, bank-based financial systems have not been supplanted by capital market-based financial systems. Instead, financial intermediation chains have lengthened with the expanded role of NBFIs in mobilizing capital from non-financial sectors [Schmidt, Hackethal and Tyrell, 1999] . Growing functional specialisation of NBFIs reflects deepening market segmentation. As part of the demand-side of financial intermediation, NBFIs have retained their critical role in servicing the particular needs of SMEs that are neglected by equity markets and major banks.
Non-Banking Financial Intermediation in Asia
To the extent that historical insights may be extended from early North Atlantic industrialisers to contemporary Asian economies, it is apparent that NBFIs represent an enduring rather than transient phase of economic development. To be sure, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s led to bank restructuring and tighter regulation of NBFIs. A decade later, the global financial crisis also strained the real economy. But these shocks have not reduced the centrality of NBFIs for SME financing.
Korea's experience with NBFIs is instructive in this regard. During the 1980s, banks were privatised, and deregulation of the NBFI sector enabled Korea's industrial conglomerates, chaebols, to acquire controlling stakes over NBFIs. 18 Over the course of the 1990s, NBFIs increasingly made loans to chaebol affiliates, which they financed by short-term borrowing at high interest rates. By 1997, NBFIs accounted for nearly half of all assets in Korea's financial system [Carmichael and Pomerleano, 2002] . The ensuing collapse in asset prices and bursting of the credit bubble motivated consolidation of the banking sector and restructuring of chaebols. 19 In retrospect, it is evident that the combination of deregulation and weak financial supervision enabled conflict-of-interest in the corporate governance of NBFIs. NBFIs in Korea are now closely regulated and primarily serve SMEs rather than extensions of chaebols. 20 As in other parts of East and Southeast Asia, NBFIs have played a key role in Malaysia's growth process [Islam and Osman, 2011] . [Islam and Osman, 2011] . As in Korea, the NBFI sector has maintained a stable ratio of 47 per cent of the size of the banking system [Farid, 2013] .
While the role of NBFIs in promoting growth in Asia's most dynamic economies is comparable to that of NBFIs in the North Atlantic core, the contemporary scale of non-banking financial intermediation in Asia is dwarfed by that of the US where NBFI assets exceed that of the banking system [IMF, 2014] . In the US, NBFIs are associated with the broader category of shadow banking, which includes investment banks, finance companies, money market funds, hedge funds, and special purposes vehicles/entities that aggregate and hold assets [Gao and Wang, 2010] . Shadow lending is also substantial in the UK and the Euro area, where it accounts for 360 and 180 per cent of GDP, respectively. For comparative reference, Figure 6 shows the global distribution of NBFI assets. The US, Euro area, and UK account for 79 per cent of NBFI assets, while China's shadow banking sector is only 4 per cent.
As discussed earlier, however, it is more meaningful to focus on the nature of risk posed by shadow banking rather than its aggregate volume.
Returning to the three layers of shadow banking, prior to 2008, the bulk of shadow banking activity in the US occurred in the top 'bank off-balance sheet' layer, which poses the greatest degree of systemic risk. Although growth in areas,' the IMF finds that pension funds, insurance companies, and various money market, equity, bond, and hedge funds present the greatest marginal contribution to systemic risk (MCSR) in the US [Gao and Wang, 2010] . In the UK and Euro area, however, banks rather than NBFIs pose the greatest MCSR to their financial systems.
Conclusion
As in other parts of the world, China's SMEs face a financing gap that is structural in nature. Even though SMEs account for the overwhelming number of businesses, generate more employment than big businesses, and contribute meaningfully to GDP, traditional commercial banks are nonetheless biased towards larger-scale borrowers-even in highly liberalised financial systems.
The near-universal bias against SME financing has an economic logic: it is less efficient to process numerous smaller loans; and due to limited credit history, are not linked with deposits [Hsu, 2014] .
In the second, credit-enhancement layer of shadow banking, loans backed by CGCs expose banks to more traditional credit risk. Unlike complex derivatives, repackaged by multiple NBFIs, the risk from guaranteed bank loans stems from specific borrowers and should be known to the guarantor, if not the lender as well. However, as seen in the CGC case studies presented in the paper, considerable variation exists in the corporate governance, management, and sophistication of credit scoring systems employed by CGCs. This reflects in part the decentralised regulation of CGCs by local government entities.
In the third non-bank lending layer, risk is concentrated to private lenders and borrowers, so client defaults in NBFIs such as microfinance/small loan companies pose little risk to social stability or the financial system. On the other hand, P2P platforms, and rotating savings associations mobilise individual savings without regulation or government safeguards, posing more of a risk to social stability than the banking system as a whole.
As in the second credit-enhancement layer, the non-banking layer of
NBFIs encompasses a diverse range of entities. Some are unregistered, unlicensed, and limited to discrete local networks of lenders and borrowers. Interest rate liberalisation is unlikely to narrow the SME financing gap significantly, however. Besides the sheer volume of SMEs in China, the experience of other countries suggests that interest rate liberalisation does not translate into greater willingness of commercial banks to extend credit to SMEs.
Traditional constraints on limited economies of scale, credit evaluation, loan monitoring, and collection are operational, rather than purely financial issues.
Furthermore, SME promotion policies, such government-backed loan guarantee schemes, have not proven to be effective for supporting the most promising segment of SMEs.
In short, China's SME financing gap will persist. Despite official efforts at financial inclusion and interest rate liberalisation, NBFIs will remain the primary source of financing for China's SMEs. Even in advanced industrialised countries, NBFIs continue to serve critical segments of the economy due to the incentives of banks and securities markets to privilege larger-scale businesses. China's stateowned commercial banks and stock markets face similar incentives, but these are compounded by the political prioritisation of state firms in strategic sectors.
Formal financial institutions in China are biased against SME clients for both economic and political reasons. By contrast, NBFIs are unencumbered by these dual constraints. Motivated by the glaring SME financing gap, a remarkable variety of NBFIs have flourished and floundered in China in the past three decades. Sensationalised accounts of shadow banking obscure the fact that an elite subset of credit guarantee, small loan, and financial leasing companies has developed locally grounded expertise in serving the particular needs of SMEs.
Such NBFIs employ rigorous methods of financial accounting, credit scoring, and loan monitoring because they seek risk-adjusted returns on their investment.
They are motivated by profit rather than politics.
Going forward, the policy challenge thus lies in establishing a regulatory framework for NBFIs that promotes best practices in a sector that has inspired both financial innovation as well as malfeasance. Fortunately, a modest core of well-managed, legally registered NBFIs provides a foundation for guiding future regulation. Within this core, foreign-invested and listed NBFIs are poised to provide a positive demonstration effect for corporate governance, credit evaluation techniques, and risk management. This is not to say that foreigninvested NBFIs are immune from scandal (e.g., Credit Orienwise). But such cases should be distinguished from legitimate NBFIs that are closely supervised by private stakeholders, both domestic and foreign, who are invested in building commercially successful NBFIs that serve SMEs.
Regulators have an opportunity to move such NBFIs out of the shadows.
This sector is likely to grow and innovate rapidly and should be managed as a key source of SME funding. Reducing the opportunities for inter-bureaucratic and cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage could be a guiding principle for a process that is bound to be complex. Multiple bureaucracies govern the spectrum of quasi-regulated NBFIs. The non-banking sector has this in common with other sectors in China's fragmented authoritarian political economy. Explains disputed legal problems in financial leasing businesses.
1 China's official definition of SMEs has shifted over the course of the reform era, and also varies by industry. Appendix A delineates the various official definitions of SMEs by sector. 2 There was an ideological rationale for this restriction on the number of employees that private firms could hire. According to Karl Marx's Das Kapital, household producers with less than eight workers are considered 'non-exploitative,' while those with more than eight employees are 'exploitative capitalist producers.' 3 The following section draws in part from [author self-reference deleted]. 4 In practice, banks have managed to evade interest rate ceilings on loans by requiring borrowers to re-deposit half of the loan with the lending bank, but such practices obfuscate transparency in loan documentation. 5 Of course informal finance in China not only pre-dates the reform era, but has been traced back to emergence of the private lending contract in the Xi-Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC). For a brief overview, see Jiang (2009). 6 There are two main opportunities for financial arbitrage. First, because bank deposit rates are artificially repressed, there is market demand for higher-yielding investment products offered through banks. Second, because banks face very high reserve requirements as well as sectorbased restrictions on lending activity, they move their lending off-balance sheet by investing in assets that would ordinarily be financed through bank credit.
